Britain, Anti-German Propaganda, and Greece During the First World War

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Abstract

This working paper reconstructs the role of intellectuals and policymakers in shaping the anti-German component of British propaganda during the First World War in the context of the scholar and public debate in the country on the causes of the war and Britain's war aims. Special emphasis is given to the formulation of their discursive strategies and to their conceptual tools. Territorial questions and questions of state-building in Central and Southeastern Europe represent an important axis in this respect as they contributed to the content of elite-oriented propaganda. The elite journal *New Europe* offers a revealing example of this trend. The writings of Ronald Burrows and his stance on the Greek case are here explored as aspects of British WWI propaganda.

Keywords: Britain, Intellectuals, Propaganda, German Empire, Greece, First World War, 'New Europe'

Introduction

The British entered the First World War, in A.J.P. Taylor's words, *"for a cause…the neutrality and independence of 'little Belgium'"*.[1] Britain's leading liberal statesmen made the case for the war on the basis of a moral and legal international obligation. The foreign minister, Edward Grey, warned that the German threat to Belgium's neutrality undermined Britain's moral position, jeopardised the existing international order and compromised the empire's trade interests. Referring to the Great Old Man of English liberalism Grey raised the moral bar: *"If Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any power?"*[2] From this starting point, this working paper seeks to trace the discursive strategies employed in the context of the British public debate which allowed for the framing of Britain's war aims in relation to the anti-German argument. It follows the discursive milestones and turning points in this debate and emphasises the role of British intellectuals and scholars in the shaping of British anti-German propaganda.

Setting up the anti-German campaign: Between politics and propaganda

Prime Minister Asquith summed up the case for the war in two sentences: *"to fulfil a solemn international obligation"*, and *"to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power"*.[3] The radical Lloyd George joined the chorus emphasising the *"honourable obligation"* to defend what Clemenceau referred to as the *"Latin cause"* of the *"independence of nationalities in Europe"*.[4] To the calls for the protection of small states, Lloyd George, who was Welsh, added his admiration for Europe's *"little nations"*:

> [T]he greatest art of the world…came from little nations. The greatest literature of England came from her when she was a nation of the size of Belgium fighting a great Empire. The heroic deeds that thrill humanity through generations were the deeds of little nations fighting for their freedom. Ah, yes, and the salvation of mankind came through a little nation, God has chosen little nations as the vessels by which he carries the choicest wines to the lips of humanity, to rejoice their hearts, to exalt their vision, to stimulate and to strengthen their faith; and if we had stood by when two little nations were being crushed and broken by the brutal hands of barbarism our shame would have rung down the everlasting ages.[5]

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[1] A.J.P. Taylor, *The First World War: An Illustrated History* (London: Penguin, 1974), p. 22.
[2] Sir Edward Grey's Speech before Parliament, 3 August 1914, last modified 30 September 2014, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Sir_Edward_Grey's_Speech_Before_Parliament.
[3] H.H. Asquith, "House of Commons Speech", in *War Speeches by British Ministers 1914-16* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1914).
[4] Georges Clemenceau, "War Address", 5 August 1914, last modified 30 September 2014, http://www.gwpda.org/1914/clemenso.html; David Lloyd George, "Queen's Hall Speech", in *War Speeches by British Ministers 1914-16* (London: T. Fisher Unwin 19 September, 1914).
[5] David Lloyd George, "Queen's Hall Speech".

On Lloyd George's account, *'little'* Belgium stood side by side with '*little*' Serbia. For others invested in Balkans affairs such as G.M. Trevelyan, Serbia was *"a hero nation"* and the war had set the foundations for a friendship similar to what *"has bound Greece and Italy to this country by the memory of the sympathy and aid we gave to them in the hour of their birth-throes"*.[6]

But not everybody supported Britain's entry in the war. The reactions to the question of British intervention oscillated between pacifist arguments that rejected the use of military force as a matter of principle and those that demanded neutrality. Liberal and radical advocates of neutrality congregated in the *Union of Democratic Control* (UDC).[7] According to E.D. Morel the UDC's political agenda combined *"both the national and the international aim"*. On the one hand, it supported the principle of *"popular consent"* in territorial transfers and in the exercise of foreign policy. On the other hand, it envisaged the creation of an *"international machinery supported by the collective will of people"* with a mandate to enforce decisions in the disputes between States.[8] Although Morel apprehended the *"ethical"* argument for the popular support of the war out of *"pity and indignation"* for Belgium, he highlighted the 'utilitarian' side of the argument for neutrality by opposing the prevailing in Britain *"Teutonic demonology"*.[9] In any case, despite the voices of dissent, the formal British entry in the war rested on a wider patriotic consensus.[10]

In one of his widely disseminated earlier interventions in favour of Britain's involvement in the war, Gilbert Murray wondered: *"How can War ever be right?"* His response was primarily directed against those who professed neutrality, *"judg[ing?] the war as a profit and loss account"*. Against this detached rationalism Murray put forward an account of the feeling of *"honour"*. His Hellenism took him to Thermopylae: the Spartans knew that they would be defeated, but they would not *"consent to their country's dishonour"*.[11] According to

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[6] Trevelyan prompted "Mr. Carnegie [to] send his next International Commission to the North-West of Serbia" to record the atrocities of the Austro-Hungarian army. The Balkan peoples, he exclaimed, *"are not a set of savages; they are peasants, with the peasants' virtues and limitations; some of them under bad influences have sometimes committed atrocities in former wars, as we should expect from people just set free from Turkish tyranny"*. Ibid., p.283. G.M. Trevelyan, "Serbia Revisited", *The Contemporary Review* 107 (1915): p. 274. See also Alastair MacLachlan, "Becoming National? G. M. Trevelyan: The Dilemmas of a Liberal (Inter)Nationalist, 1900–1945", *Humanities Research: The Journal of the Research School of Humanities and the Arts, the Australian National University,* XIX, no. 1 (2013); R.J. Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2009), pp. 97-101.

[7] Martin Ceadel, *Living the Great Illusion: Sir Norman Angel 1872-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 153.

[8] E.D. Morel, *Truth and the War* (London: The National Labour Press), pp. 169-183.

[9] Ibid., pp. 190-1.

[10] See also Adrian Gregory, "British 'War Enthusiasm' in 1914: A Reassessment", in *Evidence, History and the Great War*, ed. Gail Braybon (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2003).

[11] Gilbert Murray, *How Can War Ever Be Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914), pp. 6-7. Murray's pamphlet had been widely disseminated to all lecturers of the Oxford university extension board and to branch secretaries of trade unions across the country. Cf. Gilbert Murray *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1915* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1915); Peter Wilson, "Gilbert Murray and International Relations: Hellenism, Liberalism, and International Intellectual Cooperation as a Path to Peace", *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 02 (2010): p. 885.

Murray, individual honour and national honour coincided. In the same way that no man's sense of honour would permit him to stay indifferent to the sight of a little girl in need, no true citizen could abstain from his civic duties. To be a citizen is to honour one's obligations. To be a nation is to honour one's international obligations. And in the case of the *"violation"* of Belgium's neutrality, Murray asserted, *"our interest coincides with our honour…it is one of the old optimistic beliefs of the nineteenth century liberalism, and one which is often ridiculed, that a nation's duty generally does coincide with its interest"*.[12]

Bertrand Russell, on the other hand, picked up the discussion of duty, glory and honour.[13] He appealed to *"impartial Reason"*; to Murray's moralising, he contrasted the image of Europe as a house caught on fire, whose inhabitants, rather than acting rationally, that is *"try[ing] to escape and to extinguish the flames"*, have begun *"accusing each other of having caused the conflagration"*.[14] This state of affairs, Russell retorted, is *"barbarous, contrary to reason, contrary to humanity, utterly contrary to self-interest, a return to the savage beneath the miserable rags of a tawdry morality"*.[15] For Russell it was clear that *"honour"* and *"interest"* could not be primary justifications of the war. Rather, it was the unceasing striving for *"honour"*, *"interest"* and glory on the part of the nation-states of Europe that had brought about the war in the first place.

In a racialised language, Russell held that the war was the product of the conflict between the *"Teuton"* and the *"Slav"* stemming from the largely incompatible *"primitive passions"* in the *"temper of these two races"*. Although the assassination of the Archduke was an act typical of the *"barbarism"* of the Serbs, the conflict was waged *"essentially for the defence of the Teutonic and Slavic honours"*.[16] Russell shared with Murray an interest in the psychological foundations of human nature and both were increasingly wary of the calamitous consequences of the *"herd instinct"* in international politics.[17] The only way out of this 'universal reign of fear', Russell asserted, was the creation of a peace league, which would

[12] Murray, *How Can War Ever Be Right*, p. 7.
[13] See also William Bruneau, "Gilbert Murray and Bertrand Russell", in *Gilbert Murray Reassessed* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 201-6. On Russell's wartime activism, see Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude 1872-1921* (New York: The Free Press, 1996), pp. 367-605; Philip Ironside, *The Social and Political Thought of Bertrand Russell: The Development of an Aristocratic Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 85-126.
[14] Bertrand Russell, *War the Offspring of Fear* (London: UDC, 1914), p. 3. By using this analogy, Russell follows many in projecting onto the international sphere concurrent debates on crowd psychology and the herd instinct. Cf. Graham Wallas, *The Great Society* (London: Macmillan, 1914), p. 152; Glenda Sluga, *The Nation, Psychology and International Politics* (London: Macmillan, 2006), pp. 45-6. Ironside, *The Social and Political Thought of Bertrand Russell*, pp. 88-9.
[15] Russell, *War the Offspring of Fear*, p. 3.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Bertrand Russell, *Political Ideals* (New York: The Century, 1917), pp. 145-55; Gilbert Murray, *Faith, War and Policy: Addresses and Essays on the European War* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1917), pp. 46-67. Cf. Bruneau, "Gilbert Murray and Bertrand Russell", pp. 210-11; Sluga, *The Nation, Psychology and International Politics*, pp. 46-48.

drive Europe away from the status of *"Somalialand"* to which it had regressed and render *"the attractive Palmerstonian attitude of champions of right against oppression"* obsolete.[18]

In the first months of the war the rise of anti-German sentiment presented a real challenge.[19] Writing to the Welsh Oxford don John Rhys, pioneer of Celtic studies and principal of Jesus College, Frederick Pollock conferred the news that people from Aberystwyth, most likely students, were persecuting a *"poor old German Orientalist"* who had lived in England and in Aberystwyth more than forty years and concluded by condemning *"the kind of civic education they get from halfpenny rags"*.[20] While editing one of the first publications on the war, the naturalised British Don with central European roots, Alfred Zimmern expressed his disdain at having to *"teach English people that Germans are wickeder than they supposed"*. Yet it was a necessary task, as *"some of the labour people still seem to be unconvinced"*.[21] Writing in public. Zimmer argued that *"some of us, British citizens, but proud even now to be Germans by blood, by intellectual affinity, and by sensibility, can see more clearly…what are the real issues involved in this conflict…This is a war not between peoples, but between ideas. Just because it is a war of ideas it must be fought out sternly…"*[22]

As the war commenced, many scholars who did not enlist for military service congregated in London and took up propaganda and government work wishing to educate the nation and the policy makers and to influence public opinion in other parts of the world, notably in the US.[23] A number of lectures and events were set up in educational institutions across the country with the aim of introducing the public to the past and present of European friends and foes. Another set of initiatives emanated from Oxford. The political justification for Britain's involvement in the war was picked up by more than eighty pamphlets, which sought to further elucidate the question of the origins of the war.[24] Their concern was to present the

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[18] Russell, *War the Offspring of Fear*. See also Casper Sylvest, "Russell's Realist Radicalism", *The International History Review* 36 (2014): pp. 9-11.

[19] Cf. Stuart Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics 1914-18* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1988).

[20] Pollock to Rhys, 16 October 1914, John Rhys MS. WNL. A1.1.45.

[21] Zimmern MS. Bodl. 9/8. R.W. Seton-Watson, Dover Wilson, Alfred E. Zimmern and Arthur Greenwood, *The War and Democracy* (London: Macmillan, 1914). The volume's recurring themes revolved around narratives of the growth of the national idea in Europe; recent developments in Russia and Austria-Hungary; the question of war aims with respect to the geopolitical reordering of the world; a survey of European foreign policy since the Congress of Vienna; the setting of a preliminary agenda for a more democratic British foreign policy; accounts of the social and economic tasks that the war bestowed upon the British people. Seton-Watson contributed the chapter on Austro-Hungarian politics and when advised to make his text more accessible protested over the *"hopelessness of trying to explain the Dual Monarchy to a working class public"*. *"The only alternative of which I am capable"*, he exclaimed, *"is to be discursive, gossipy and unconnected, and I should not come to print that under my name"*. Seton-Watson to Zimmern, Zimmern MS.Bod.14/94.

[22] A.E. Zimmern, *The Nation,* 5 September 1914.

[23] Gary S. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany*, p. 31. See also David Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain: The National Aims Committee* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012). On similar developments in France see: Martha Hanna, *The Mobilization of the Intellect: French Scholars and Writers During the Great War* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 23.

[24] H.W.C Davis, E. Barker, C.R.L. Fletcher, A. Hassall, L.G. Wickham Legg, F. Morgan, *Why We Are at War: Great Britain's Case* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); To the Christian Scholars of Europe and America a

public with a formal account of the events that led to the declaration of the war, to introduce the public to the history of the European nations, to respond to allegations made by Germans and other British radicals, and to promote patriotic feeling among wider segments of society.[25] One of the most important long-range initiatives was the inauguration of a series of monographs on the *"belligerent nations"* under the supervision of Ernest Barker and W.C. Davies. The series may in some ways be seen as a successor to Hartford Mackinder's *"regions of the world"* series at the turn of the century.[26] The world represented in the series was not one of *"regions"* and *"civilisations"*, but one of nation-states. The plan was to devise a number of *"frankly popular"* volumes designed to give a rapid historical survey with *"due emphasis on tendencies"*.[27]

The two first volumes, although formally not attached to the series, concerned Prussia and the Balkans.[28] The Balkan volume was among the most popular. It was a compilation of essays by Oxford-based scholars, with the exception of *"a Romanian"*, in Barker's words, the LSE-based David Mitrany.[29] The archaeologist and keeper at the Ashmolean, David Hogarth, who was consulted in matters pertaining to the Near/Middle East, contributed the chapter on Turkey, shortly before he departed for the region.[30] Arnold Toynbee offered the chapter on Greece, Mitrany wrote on Romania, and Oxford's incumbent Russianist, Nevill Forbes, offered his views on Bulgaria and Serbia. The volume underplayed the political differences among the Balkan nations, and Serbians and Bulgarians alike were viewed as innocent victims of the machinations of a Dual Monarchy that rapidly fell prey to a Prussianised Germany. Thus, the blame for the second Balkan war fell squarely with Vienna, Budapest and the *"Germanic school of diplomacy"* that influenced Bulgaria.[31] This reading conformed to the guidelines of the press that *"it is the converging lines and tendencies resulting in the Balkan Wars and in the present situation which the public want at length"*.[32]

Reply from Oxford to the German Address to Evangelical Christians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914). Cf. William Whyte, "Oxford University Press, 1896-9145", in *History of Oxford University Press* Volume III: 1896 to 1970, ed.Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 72-4; Hew Strachan, *The First World War Volume I: To Arms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1124, 1158; Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War: Explaining World War I* (London: Penguin, 2009), pp. 227-232.

[25] Gary S. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State*, p. 25. It would be wrong to assume that Oxford was the only institution that rallied up to the war cause and that Cambridge remained the hub of radical thinking. There were many high-profile professors at Cambridge who also made the case for the war. Conversely, at Oxford too there were professors who opposed the war, albeit only a vanishingly small number. For nuances see J.M.Winter, "Oxford and the First World War", in *The History of the University of Oxford: The Twentieth Century* ed. Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Harmut Pogge Von Strandmann, "The Role of British and German Historians in Mobilising Public Opinion in 1914", in *British and German Historiography 1750-1950: Traditions, Perceptions, Transfers*, ed. Benedict Stuchtey and Peter Wende (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Niall Ferguson, "Battle of the Dons of War", *Times Literary Supplement,* 30 October 1998.

[26] Cf. H. J. Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas* (New York: D. Appleton and co., 1902).

[27] OUP MS. Cpedoo 1197/CP/70/1832.

[28] Leslie Howsam, *Past into Print: The Publishing History in Britain 1850-1950* (London: The British Library and the University of Toronto Press, 2009), p. 84.

[29] Barker to Seton-Watson, 19 September 1916, Seton-Watson MS. SSEES, 17/1/9.

[30] D.G. Hogarth, *The Nearer East* (London: William Heinemann, 1902).

[31] Arnold J. Toynbee, Nevill Forbes, D. Mitrany, D. G. Hogarth, *The Balkans* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915).

[32] Clarendon Press to Mitrany, 4 July 1915, Mitrany MS. LSE 2.

As the war progressed a good number of the younger scholars that participated in some of the aforementioned schemes and professed linguistic and regional expertise formed the nucleus of the expert advisers at the Foreign Office, in which, in David Mitrany's words, the *"Oxford men"* proliferated. Among the various institutions, the Political Intelligence Department stood out, with the task of synthesising various reports and filtering information through the production of memoranda on the political conditions in the belligerent countries.[33] In this context, the *New Europe* magazine that Seton-Watson inaugurated in 1916 became their mouthpiece and was influential in bringing about a shift in British policy with regard to the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the need for the war to continue until the final defeat of Germany.

The discussion on Central Europe in Britain was influenced by the publication of Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa,* in 1915 following the formal articulation of Germany's imperial vision for Central Europe. Addressing debates on national efficiency, the political union that Naumann advocated was primarily of an economic character. It presupposed the bringing about of an *Oberstaat* including Germany and Austria-Hungary and much of the region spreading from France to Finland and from Germany to Russia, as well as the Balkans and possibly Italy. The liberal character of the union he proposed was evident in his rejection of policies of forced Germanisation. Rather, he contended that the national autonomy of the Mitteleuropeans would resemble the organisation of Austria-Hungary.[34] The reception of *Mitteleuropa* in England, not without exceptions, viewed Naumann, Gooch's *"old friend"*, as an exponent of German militarism.[35] The editor of the English translation lamented Naumann's purported shift from advocating Free Trade and social causes to advocating Prussian principles.[36]

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[33] Erik Goldstein, "The Foreign Office and Political Intelligence 1918-1920", *Review of International Studies* 14 (1988); Alan Sharp, *Some Relevant Historians - the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, 1918-20*. At the same time, Political Intelligence was complemented with the inauguration of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office and the production of a series of handbooks on the national questions that were to be negotiated in Paris. The editor of the *Cambridge Modern History Series*, George Prothero, oversaw the production of tens of volumes of handbooks with historical, economic, political and geographical data for the British delegates at the Paris Peace Conference composed by over eighty 'experts'. The themes covered developments in Asia, Africa and Europe and the majority of the European volumes with the 'racial' problems in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. Erik Goldstein*, Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920*, pp. 39-41.

[34] Karel Čapek, *Talks with T.G. Masaryk* (London: Catbird Press, 1995), p. 213. Very tellingly, Naumann's work was criticised both by the nationalists and by the Social Democrats in Germany. Cf. Friedrich Naumann, *Mitteleuropa* (G. Reimer: Berlin, 1915); Friedrich Naumann*, Central Europe* (London: P.S. King and son, 1916).

[35] Cf. H.J. Mackinder, "The Problem of Central Europe", *The Observer*, 27 August 1916, p. 4; For a different reading see H.N. Brailsford, "The Shaping of Mid-Europe", *Contemporary Review* 106 (1916): pp. 338-49. Hartford Mackinder became the chairman of a new joint committee that stemmed from an attempt to co-ordinate the British-Italian, the Anglo-Romanian and the Anglo-Hellenic League. Cf. Peter Bugge, 'The Use of the Middle: Mitteleuropa Vs. Střední Evropa", *European Review of History/Revue Européene d' histoire* 6, no.1 (1999). See also Gooch to Seton-Watson, 18 February 1916, Seton-Watson MS, SSEES. 17/8/3.

[36] Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary*, pp. 201-2.

The inauguration of the *New Europe* magazine coincided with the increasing importance of the eastern front, the reverberations of the concessions offered to Italian irredentism and the slow start of the formulation of the British war aims in anticipation of the American intervention. Yet in August 1916, as Adam Tooze has put it, *"it was not President Wilson but Prime Minister Bratianu in Bucharest who appeared to hold the fate of the world in its hands"*.[37] According to Seton-Watson, the success of the Romanian offensive would thwart Bulgarian aspirations for hegemony in the Balkans and put an end to Austria-Hungary's dominance in the region, isolating Germany from its eastern counterparts. It would also allow the Romanians of Transylvania to liberate themselves from *"one of the grossest tyrannies which modern Europe has ever known"*.[38] The magazine's inauguration was in part a response to the British concessions towards Italian nationalism, which were thought by Seton-Watson and his South Slav coterie as a threat to the prospects of a viable South Slav State.[39]

The voice of Greece in the *New Europe* was the principal of King's College, London and key member of the Anglo-Hellenic League, Ronald Burrows. From 1916 until the end of the war, Burrows offered op-eds on Greece in the magazine and became Venizelos' unofficial representative in Britain. Here is how he presented, in October 1916, the case for the abandonment of neutrality:

> Our only claim to involve Greece is that we are voicing the wishes of the most virile and vigorous elements in Greece, the men who saved Greece from the slough of the Turkish war of 1897. The party leaders of pre-Venizelish Greece, who have come to life again to back the King's policy… felt no thrill when Venizelos aimed at gathering the Greeks of Asia Minor under the flag… in their heart of hearts they care not at all for securing the maritime power of Greece by alliance with England and France.[40]

In a follow-up article written in November 1916, while the allied intervention in Greece was in full swing, Burrows disagreed with the British interventionist policy in the following manner:

> By our present half-hearted policy we are not only failing to safeguard our own interests, but we are at the same time, grossly violating the neutrality of Greece… we have sized fleet, railways, posts and telegraphs. We have dismissed Ministries and demobilised armies. Yet we fondly imagine that we are respecting Greek independence because we refrain from touching the sacred person of an autocrat… It is not surprising that our policy has been construed in Athens as a severe snub to the Venizelist movement.[41]

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[37] Naumann, *Central Europe*, pp. vi-vii.
[38] *The New Europe* 1:1 (1916), p. 27. Cf. Peter Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy 1914-1925* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 36-9.
[39] David Mitrany, *Greater Roumania* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917).
[40] R. Burrows, "Wanted: A policy in Greece", *The New Europe* Vol 1, N.2 (26 October 1916), 55-6.
[41] R. Burrows "Still Wanted: A Policy in Greece", *The New Europe* Vol 1, N.3 (2 November 1916), 93-4.

Epilogue

Burrow's point was that the allied intervention in Greece would not play well domestically because it would allow those in the royalist side to make the argument that Venizelos surrendered Greece's sovereignty to the Allies. But what is interesting is that Burrow's harked back to the London protocol of 1830 and the role of *"guarantor powers"* to justify the Allied intervention in Greece.

As the Venizelist regime consolidated its power and emerged victorious from the divisions during 1916, Burrows turned his attention to the need to combat anti-Venizelist, royal propaganda. Writing in the summer of 1917, he conceded that *"the exile or interment of 200 men should be enough"* to deal with the danger presented by the pro-German party in Greece. But the problem was elsewhere – not with the committed pro-Germans, but with those in Greece who thought of neutrality as a reasonable course of affairs: *"there exists a considerable body of opinion which, up to a fortnight ago, had been against Greece entering the war… How are we to convert this element of the population and at the same time retain unimpaired the enthusiastic support of the Venizelists?"*[42] Burrows' remarks are revealing for the gap between elite and mass perceptions concerning the War and the European Great Powers in Greek society. British propaganda officials also drew similar conclusions processing various information and intelligence. From that perspective, the challenge of widespread pro-neutralism among Greek public opinion could not be addressed with the same tools that were meant to implement propaganda for Greek and European political and intellectual elites. The demands of mass propaganda were an altogether different matter that is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it can be argued that elite propaganda strategies -mostly focusing on the anti-German argument- influenced to an extent the assumptions and the conceptual tools of mass oriented propaganda as well.

[42] R. Burrows, *The New Europe*, 21 June 1917.